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System. 1 Introduction
More attention is now paid to the ￿nancial and economic activities in emerging
economies than in the past. The collapse and recovery in the global economy
caused by the recent ￿nancial crisis induced a heated discussion on de-coupling
or re-coupling of ￿nancial markets and real economic activities between developed
countries and emerging economies. The former view is as follows: even though the
￿nancial and economic recovery in developed countries are sluggish, the high growth
in emerging economies will sustain globally high economic and ￿nancial growth. On
the other hand, however, a number of reports claim that there exists no such thing
as de-coupling and simultaneous contractions around the world is indeed a sign of
re-coupling.
Which of the two stories, namely de-coupling or re-coupling, is more compelling?
This is an interesting question, the answer to which should be important not only
in understanding the status quo but also to have prospects for future developments.
In this paper, we particularly focus on Asian economies and their interactions with
developed countries. As reported by Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2009), these
countries have so far experienced less severe contractions. 1 Some also point out
the importance of China as an important player to determine the global ￿nancial
and economic developments. Against this background, we try to answer following
questions. How are Asian ￿nancial markets interlinked and how are they linked to
markets in developed countries? What is the main driver of ￿uctuations in Asian
￿nancial markets as well as real economic activities?
We estimate the spillover index proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) and
gauge the degree of interactions in ￿nancial markets as well as real economic ac-
tivities among Asian economies. We ￿rst show that the degree of the international
spillover in stock markets is like cookie-cutter products, namely, uniform, irrespec-
tive of the groups of countries, such as G3, NIEs and ASEAN. This suggests the
importance of the globally common shock in stock markets. We, then, discuss the
macro-￿nance dissonance. In stock and bond markets, the US has been the main
driver of ￿uctuations. Regarding real economic activities, China has emerged as an
important source of ￿uctuations. Finally, we also report that in￿ation expectations
seem to be a key driver of country speci￿c developments in nominal bond yields.
Understanding the international interactions in both ￿nancial and real economic
activities is a long-standing agenda. There exist a number of related studies to our
1Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2009) stress the importance of the foreign reserve accumu-
lation after the Asian ￿nancial crisis.
2paper on this issue. Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003, 2008), Gregory and Head
(1999), Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) and Del-Negro and Otrok (2008) investigate
global co-movements in output and consumptions. King, Sentana, and Wadhwani
(1994), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) study the degree
of interactions in stock markets, and Al Awad and Goodwin (1998), Dungey, Martin,
and Pagan (2000) and Diebold, Li, and Yue (2008) inquire into that in bond markets.
So far as we know, however, no studies have yet focused on the interactions of Asian
economies. There have been previous studies dealing with ￿nancial markets and real
economic activities, but only separately. Our paper compares the characteristics
between ￿nancial markets and real economic activities. 2 Also, we focus on the
developments in international interactions during the recent ￿nancial crisis, which
has not been yet fully scrutinized.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 demonstrates
the methodology used in this paper. In Section 3, we show the data and compare
them to the theoretical prediction obtained from a simple dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model. Section 4 shows how the linkage among Asian ￿nancial markets
has been evolving and what is the sources of ￿uctuations. In addition, we also discuss
the macro-￿nance dissonance and the background behind this result. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 Methodology
We evaluate the degree of ￿nancial and economic interactions among Asian economies
by computing the spillover index proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). The
spillover index evaluates how the forecast error in one country is a￿ected by the
shocks occurred in other countries. It is a measures to evaluate the degree of global
interdependence and clari￿es the origin country of ￿uctuations.
We ￿rst estimate the reduced form VAR (p) model:
zt = A1zt 1 + ::: + Apzt p + ut; (1)
where zt denotes a N  1 vector of targeted variables, namely log di￿erence of the
stock price, di￿erence of bond yields, or di￿erence of industrial production from its
trend for country n. A denotes a N  N parameter matrix. ut denotes a N  1
2Even regarding developments in ￿nancial markets, previous studies focuses on either stock or
bond markets.









We use the daily data for stock prices and bond yields, and the monthly data for
industrial production.3 p is set to 5 (days) for the stock price and bond yields, and
1 (month) for industrial production.
We, then, re-write (1) into the moving average representation:
zt = (I   A1L   :::   ApL
p)
 1 ut





C(L) = C0 + C1L + ::: + C1L
1:
4t denotes a N 1 vector of idiosyncratic (country speci￿c) shocks, whose variance-
covariance matrix is made to be the identity matrix. B is a N N lower triangular




In the vector, zt, the countries (markets) are ordered according to the market closing
time. No signi￿cant di￿erences are, however, observed in di￿erent orderings.
For our intuitive understanding of the computation of the spillover index, let
us explain how to compute the spillover index for a 1-step-ahead forecasts when
N = 2 and p = 1. A 1-step-ahead forecasting error vector under this assumption is
expressed as













3This is simply due to the data availability.
4C0 :::C1 can be computed recursively. See, for example, Hamilton (1994).










With zt = (z1;t;z2;t)
T at hand, the spillover index, for example, shows what fraction
of the 1-step-ahead error variance in forecasting z1 is attributable to the shock to z1
or z2. There exist two types of spillovers, namely e￿ects from shocks to z1;t on the
forecast error variance of z2;t and vice versa. Hence, the total spillover in this model
is de￿ned as c2
0;12 + c2




































Similarly, the country j’s speci￿c spillover index, where j is is either China, Japan











The forecast horizon, H, is set to 10 (days) for stock prices and bond yields, and
6 (months) for industrial production. Since we are interested in the intertemporal
evolution of the global spillover, we estimate (1) for the past 200 days for stock
prices and bond yields, and for the past 40 months for industrial production. 5
3 Data and Theoretical Prediction
In this section, we describe the details of the data used in this paper. We also
evaluate them through the lens of a simple two-country dynamic stochastic general
5For daily returns, we follow Diebold and Yilmaz (2009), which estimate the model for past
200 observations rolling samples. Since we have only 126 samples for industrial productions, we
arbitrarily set the rolling sample for the past 40 months.
5Table 1: Stock Price Index
Markets Index
Taiwan Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock
Japan Nikkei 225
Korea Korean Composite Stock Price
Phillippines PSE Composite
China SSE Composite
Hong Kong Hang Seng
Singapore MSCI Singapore
Indonesia JSX Composite
Malaysia FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI
Thailand SET
Euro Euro Stoxx 50
the US S&P 500
equilibrium model.
3.1 Data
Stock prices are downloaded from the Bloomberg from May 21, 1992 to August
31, 2010. The indices used in this paper are summarized in Table 2. Regarding
Singapore, since the representative index, SGX, is not available for a long time
series, we instead use the MSCI Singapore index. Figure 1 displays these series,
where the order is that in the estimated VARs as in following Figure 2 and 3.
Bond yields for Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore are downloaded from
the Data Stream. Others are taken from the Bloomberg. Since the data availability
of bond yields is limited, we estimate the model for the period from July 21, 2005
to August 31, 2010. Figure 2 shows the time series of bond yields.
Industrial productions are taken from o￿cial releases. 6 The estimated period is
from January 1995 to June 2010. Since the seasonally adjusted series are not avail-
able for some countries, we compute them for Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand
by X12-ARIMA, and for Indonesia by TRAMO with two dummy series for outliers. 7
Regarding China, only annual growth rates are available. In order to obtain season-
ally adjusted series, we ￿rst assume industrial productions throughout 1994 is unity.
We, then, estimate the seasonally adjusted series by X12-ARIMA with Chinese new
year dummies. Since our focus is on ￿uctuations in business cycle frequencies, we
6The data for Hong Kong is available only for quarterly frequency.
7The ￿rst dummy series put unity on January 1999, January 2000, December 2001, and De-
cember 2002. The second dummy series put unity on November 2002 and October 2004.
6Figure 1: Stock Price
de-trend the series by the HP (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) ￿lter. Developments in
monthly industrial productions are demonstrated in Figure 3.
3.2 Theoretical Prediction
In order to compare the data in Figure 1 to 3 with theoretical prediction, we use a
simple two-county dynamic stochastic equilibrium model based on Backus, Kehoe,
and Kydland (1992).8 The model is very simple and lacks many realistic aspects in
the international ￿nancial markets, such as nominal rigidities or incomplete ￿nancial
markets.9 Nonetheless, a theoretical prediction from such a simple model can be a
reference for the data evaluation.
There exist two symmetric country. In a simple model based on Backus, Kehoe,
and Kydland (1992), we have no distortion and the equilibrium is e￿cient. As a
8Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) is the most simple model in international business cycle
analysis. See Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) for the case when the terms of trade matter,
Baxter and Crucini (1995), Kollmann (1996) or Kehoe and Perri (2002) for the case when the
international ￿nancial markets are incomplete, and Stockman and Tesar (1995) for the case with
non tradable goods.
9Yet, fully speci￿ed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for open economies, that are
estimated and can explain the data well, have not yet been materialized.
7Figure 2: Bond Yields
Figure 3: Industrial Productions
8result, thanks to the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, we can
derive the equilibrium conditions in a competitive equilibrium by the planner’s prob-
lem. The global social planner maximizes the sum of the welfare in both countries









subject to the resource constraint:











and the law of motion for capital:
























ct and ht denote consumption and labor supply. it and kt denote investment and
capital stock.  and  denote the subjective discount factor and the depreciation
rate. zt and z
t denote the domestic and foreign technology shocks, while  zt denotes
the globally common technology shock. u() denotes utility function, f () denotes
production function and () denotes adjustment cost function. The superscript 
denotes foreign variables. Appendix A shows the derivation of equilibrium conditions
from the planner’s problem in (4) to (7).
Figure 4 presents impulse responses to both the globally common and the foreign
technology shocks. Naturally, under the assumption of symmetric two countries,
responses to the globally common shock are identical in both countries.
Regarding the local shock occurred only in the foreign country, arbitrage in
international ￿nancial markets results in the same real interest rates across the
globe, as shown in the middle panels. (8) in Appendix A also derives this condition
analytically.11 The foreign stock price is more increased to the foreign technology
shock than the domestic stock price. In both countries, the value of capital rises
as the marginal productivity of capital increases. In the foreign country, this is a
direct reaction to the foreign shock. On the other hand, in the domestic country,
10Here, it is 1:1 thanks to the assumption about the symmetric two countries.
11The expected real interest rates should also be the same in this model even if the market is
incomplete and the agents can only trade bonds.
9Figure 4: Impulse Responses
this stems from the capital out￿ows to more productive country. As a result of this
capital ￿ow, a local technology shock positively spillovers to the foreign stock price.
The investment adjustment costs, however, hinder the domestic stock price fully
catch up with the foreign stock price. On the other hand, outputs in both countries
move in di￿erent directions. Under the perfect risk sharing implied by the complete
￿nancial market, the more productive the country becomes, the more goods should
be produced in that country. Consequently, both labor input and output increase
in the foreign country while they decrease in the domestic country.
For a reference to the analysis with the spillover index in the next section, we
also estimate the country j’s speci￿c spillover index in (3) for the simulated data.
We ￿nd that the country j’s speci￿c spillover index for stock prices moves always
in line with that for industrial productions. Any signi￿cant deviations of these two
series are hardly observed.12
12Note that real interest rates are always equated. Therefore, we cannot compute the spillover
index for real interest rates.
10Figure 5: Real Interest Rates
3.3 Data vs Theoretical Prediction
According to the model, real bond yields should be equated around the world. If
idiosyncratic country shocks are important, stock prices and industrial productions
should be less correlated among countries than real bond yields. 13
Figure 5 displays monthly real bond yields, that is nominal bond yields minus
ex post CPI in￿ation rates. Real bond yields in each country display more or less
similar dynamics. This supports the theoretical prediction to some extent. The level
di￿erences should be attributable to the di￿erences in risk premium. 14 Especially,
in G3 countires, the levels and ￿uctuations are quite similar. This implies highly
integrated ￿nancial markets among developed countries. On the other hand, overall,
nominal bond yields are less correlated than real bond yields. In￿ation expectations
and risk premium stemming also from in￿ationary risks seem to be an important
idiosyncratic factor to characterize the developments in nominal bond yields.
Regarding stock prices and industrial productions, the degree of co-movement
13Although we show the predictions from a very simple IRBC (International Real Business Cycle)
model, results will not change even if we use the more complicated NOEM (New Open Economy
Macroeconomics) models, namely a model with nominal rigidities and many more frictions, as long
as (almost) complete risk sharing is assumed.
14Note that according to the standard theory in international ￿nance, exchange rate is passively
determined by such as the uncovered interest rate parity condition.
11becomes higher around the recent ￿nancial crisis. This should be due to the globally
common factors. According to Figures 1 to 4, however, there still remain signi￿cant
idiosyncratic ￿uctuations especially except for the period of crisis. In addition,
the dates of peaks and troughs do not coincide among economies. These implies
that a speci￿c shock to some economy may play a critical role in the dynamics of
￿nancial variables in other economies. Only with the eye-ball checking on the raw
data, it is di￿cult to grasp the in￿uences from idiosyncratic shocks or the sources
of ￿uctuations. In the next section, we formally examine these points by computing
the spillover index.
4 Results
We show the global spillover index in (2) for checking the evolution of global inter-
dependence, and the country j’s speci￿c spillover index in (3) for understanding the
sources of the ￿uctuations, where country j is either Japan, China or the US. We also
investigate the interactions within di￿erent groups of countries. The spillover index
for the groups of countries, namely, G3 (Euro area, Japan and the US), 15 NIEs
(Hong-Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan), ASEAN4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillip-
ines, Thailand), ASIA (NIEs, ASEAN4, China), and ALL (G3, ASIA), are com-
puted respectively.
4.1 Stock Price
Figure 6 shows the global spillover index in stock markets. As illustrated in the
top-left panel, the interdependence in stock markets is on an increasing trend. This
￿nding is consistent with that in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). According to Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009), this implies the gradually developing ￿nancial integration.
The index tends to become higher during the ￿nancial crisis, such as the Asian
￿nancial crisis around 1998 and the current global ￿nancial crisis after 2008. The
higher interdependence during the crisis seems to be associate with the international
￿nance multiplier and the ambiguity aversion. Regarding the former, Devereux and
Yetman (2010) reports that since banks now operate globally, a local ￿nancial crisis
can spillover through the balance sheet adjustments of globally active banks. 16 As
for the latter, Caballero and Kurlat (2009) argue that investor cannot grasp sizes
15For bond yields, we use German bonds instead of the Euro index.
16For the ampli￿cation of a negative shock through the balance sheet adjustment, see, for ex-
ample, Brunnermeier (2009) and Shin (2010).
12Figure 6: Spillover Index (Stock Price)
and transmission mechanisms of shocks in facing such an unprecedented event as
the recent ￿nancial crisis, which is associated with complicated securitized products.
Global investors, then, have become excessively avert to risks and ambiguity. Ac-
cording to Caballero and Kurlat (2009), this creates the world-wide collapse in both
￿nancial and economic activities.
The most striking ￿nding in Figure 6 is that the sizes and the developments of
the spillover index are almost identical irrespective of regions. This implies that the
stock market interdependence is not a local but a global phenomenon. 17
Figure 7 displays the country j’s speci￿c spillover index, where country j is either
China, Japan or the US. A number of reports stress an increasing in￿uence of the
China on other Asian stock markets. The Chinese in￿uence has been, however,
stable and not large so far. Concerning the developments in the stock markets in
Asian economies, the US still remains to be the major source of the co-movements.
The dynamic factor analysis in Appendix B con￿rms this US dominance and also
demonstrates that Chinese stock price ￿uctuates independently from other markets
4.2 Bond Yield
Figure 8 presents the global spillover index in bond markets. Similarly to the case
with stock markets, the index is on an increasing trend. Overall, the index, is,
17According to the dynamic factor analysis in Appendix B, the global factor is indeed an impor-
tant driver of the stock price ￿uctuations.
13Figure 7: In￿uences from China, Japan and the US (Stock Price)
Figure 8: Spillover Index (Bond Yield)
14Figure 9: In￿uences from China, Japan and the US (Bond Yield)
however, smaller in bond than stock markets. In addition, the developments of the
spillover index are quite di￿erent among regions. Figure 2 and 4 show that the
developments of nominal bond yields are di￿erent among economies, while those
in real bond yields are similar. These facts altogether imply that the idiosyncratic
movements in in￿ation expectation or risk premiums stemming from in￿ationary
risks are very important driver of nominal bond yields among Asian economies.
Figure 9 displays the country j’s speci￿c spillover index. Similarly to Figure 7,
we observe large impacts from the US and hardly ￿nd any signi￿cant increase in
Chinese in￿uences. Also, Figure 9 suggests that the developments in bond yields in
ASEAN4 countries are unique and independent from other markets.
4.3 Real Economic Activity
We investigate the global inter-relations in real economic activities to understand
the background behind the ￿nancial market integration. Figure 10 shows the global
spillover index in industrial productions. Although no clear trend is monitored in
the spillover index, it is very high around the recent global ￿nancial crisis. As
is the case with the stock price, the index becomes very high during the crisis.
This again gives some empirical supports for the stories proposed by Caballero
15Figure 10: Spillover Index (Output)
and Kurlat (2009) and Devereux and Yetman (2010). Overall, index shows similar
developments irrespective of country groups. Among them, the developments are
very similar between G3 and NIEs. This fact demonstrates the possibility that the
outputs in these countries are driven by a common shock. Also, this suggests that
a very high interdependence in ALL, ASIA and ASEAN4 stems from other sources
than the common shock among G3 and NIEs economies. We will investigate this
point below.
Figure 11 displays the country speci￿c spillover index. Quite contrary to the
cases with ￿nancial variables, impacts from China are the largest on average and re-
cently increase massively. For the robustness check, instead of using the HP-￿ltered
series, we examine the monthly growth rate of industrial production as zt in (1).18
Figure 12 illustrates the country j’s speci￿c spillover with monthly growth rates. We
obtain almost identical results. While in￿uences from the US are not impressive,
China emerges as the most important driver of real economic activities among Asian
economies. This ￿nding is puzzling, considering the results from a simulated data
from a theoretical model in the previous section: The speci￿c spillovers should show
similar dynamics between stock prices and industrial productions. Below, we will
discuss this macro-￿nance dissonance in the sources of ￿uctuations.
18Constant terms are included to avoid biases in the estimated parameters.
16Figure 11: In￿uences from China, Japan and the US (Output)
Figure 12: In￿uences from China, Japan and the US: Monthly Growth (Output)
174.4 Macro-Finance Dissonance
Stock prices and industrial productions tend to co-move, especially around the recent
￿nancial crisis. The analysis in this section, however, shows that the sources of
￿uctuations are di￿erent. The major driving force in the ￿nancial variables is a
shock speci￿c to the US markets, while that in industrial productions is a speci￿c
shock to China. A very high global spillovers in the stock prices may have little
to do with the real economic activities. We also show that the theoretical model
cannot reproduce this dissonance: stock prices are mainly driven by a shock to the
home country, while outputs are by a shock to the foreign country.
What is the reason behind this dissonance? We do not have any concrete answer.
The global equity traders (or global investment banks) and their increasing role in
the international ￿nancial markets may be the key to understand this dissonance.
The interactions between their position adjustments and time-varying risk-appetite
can be an important driver of dynamics in global stock markets, at least, at the
business cycle frequencies.19 Regarding real economic activities, as reported by
Kose and Yi (2001), the vertical integration seems to be a missing link in business
cycle co-movements among Asian economies lead by China.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the questions such as: How are Asian ￿nancial markets
interlinked and how are they linked to markets in developed countries?; What is
the main driver of ￿uctuations in Asian ￿nancial markets as well as real economic
activities? We show that (1) the degree of the international spillover in stock markets
is uniform irrespective of the groups of countries; (2) the US has been the main driver
of ￿uctuations, while China emerges as an important source of ￿uctuations in real
economic activities; (3) in￿ation expectations seems to be a key driver of country
speci￿c developments in nominal bond yields.
Although we have shown the possibility of the di￿erences in the sources of ￿uc-
tuations in macroeconomic and ￿nancial activities, there could exist a missing link
not investigated in this paper. China’s macroeconomic performance may have some
correlation with the US speci￿c shocks to both stock prices and bond yields. Since
we estimate the models separately for each ￿nancial market and real economic ac-
tivities, we have not tested this hypothesis in this paper. The more detailed microe-
19For details on this issue, see, for example, Shin (2010). In macroeconomic context, the model
by Ventura (2002) seems to be useful for the analysis on this issue.
18conomic based analysis, including the point mentioned above, on the macro-￿nance
dissonance, is left for our future research.
19References
Al Awad, Mouawiya, and Barry K. Goodwin (1998). ￿Dynamic Linkages among Real
Interest Rates in International Capital Markets.￿ Journal of International Money
and Finance, 17(6), 881￿907.
Backus, David K., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Finn E. Kydland (1994). ￿Dynamics of
the Trade Balance and the Terms of Trade: The J-Curve?.￿ American Economic
Review, 84(1), 84￿103.
Backus, David, K., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Finn E Kydland (1992). ￿International
Real Business Cycles.￿ Journal of Political Economy, 100(4), 745￿75.
Baxter, Marianne, and Mario J Crucini (1995). ￿Business Cycles and the Asset
Structure of Foreign Trade.￿ International Economic Review, 36(4), 821￿54.
Brunnermeier, Markus K. (2009). ￿Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch
2007-2008.￿ Journal of Economic Perspectives , 23(1), 77￿100.
Caballero, Ricardo, and Pablo Kurlat (2009). ￿The ￿Surprising￿ Origin and Nature
of Financial Crises: A Macroeconomic Policy Proposal.￿ In Jackson Hale Sympo-
sium on ￿Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policy￿ . Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City.
Chib, Siddhartha, and Edward Greenberg (1994). ￿Bayes Inference in Regression
Models with ARMA (p, q) Errors.￿ Journal of Econometrics, 64(1-2), 183￿206.
Del-Negro, Marco, and Christopher Otrok (2008). ￿Dynamic Factor Models with
Time-Varying Parameters: Measuring Changes in International Business Cycles.￿
Sta￿ Reports 326, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Devereux, Michael B., and James Yetman (2010). ￿Leverage Constraints and the
International Transmission of Shocks.￿ NBER Working Papers 16226, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Diebold, Francis X., Canlin Li, and Vivian Z. Yue (2008). ￿Global Yield Curve Dy-
namics and Interactions: A Dynamic Nelson-Siegel Approach.￿ Journal of Econo-
metrics, 146(2), 351￿363.
Diebold, Francis X., and Kamil Yilmaz (2009). ￿Measuring Financial Asset Return
and Volatility Spillovers, with Application to Global Equity Markets.￿ Economic
Journal, 119(534), 158￿171.
20Dungey, Mardi, Vance L Martin, and Adrian R Pagan (2000). ￿A Multivariate Latent
Factor Decomposition of International Bond Yield Spreads.￿ Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 15(6), 697￿715.
Forbes, Kristin J., and Roberto Rigobon (2002). ￿No Contagion, Only Interdepen-
dence: Measuring Stock Market Comovements.￿ Journal of Finance, 57(5), 2223￿
2261.
Gregory, Allan W., and Allen C. Head (1999). ￿Common and Country-Speci￿c Fluc-
tuations in Productivity, Investment, and the Current Account.￿ Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, 44(3), 423￿451.
Hamilton, James D. (1994). Time Series Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Harvey, A.C. (1991). Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman
Filter. Cambridge University Press.
Hodrick, Robert J, and Edward C Prescott (1997). ￿Postwar U.S. Business Cycles:
An Empirical Investigation.￿ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29(1), 1￿16.
Kehoe, Patrick J., and Fabrizio Perri (2002). ￿International Business Cycles with
Endogenous Incomplete Markets.￿ Econometrica, 70(3), 907￿928.
King, Mervyn, Enrique Sentana, and Sushil Wadhwani (1994). ￿Volatility and Links
between National Stock Markets.￿ Econometrica, 62(4), 901￿33.
Kollmann, Robert (1996). ￿Incomplete Asset Markets and the Cross-Country Con-
sumption Correlation Puzzle.￿ Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , 20(5),
945￿961.
Kose, M. Ayhan, Christopher Otrok, and Charles H. Whiteman (2003). ￿Interna-
tional Business Cycles: World, Region, and Country-Speci￿c Factors.￿ American
Economic Review, 93(4), 1216￿1239.
Kose, M. Ayhan, Christopher Otrok, and Charles H. Whiteman (2008). ￿Understand-
ing the Evolution of World Business Cycles.￿ Journal of International Economics ,
75(1), 110￿130.
Kose, M. Ayhan, and Kei-Mu Yi (2001). ￿International Trade and Business Cycles:
Is Vertical Specialization the Missing Link?.￿ American Economic Review, 91(2),
371￿375.
21Lumsdaine, Robin L., and Eswar S. Prasad (2003). ￿Identifying the Common Com-
ponent of International Economic Fluctuations: A New Approach.￿ Economic
Journal, 113(484), 101￿127.
Negishi, Takashi (1960). ￿Welfare Economics and Existence of an Equilibrium for a
Competitive Economy.￿ Metroeconomica, 12(2-3), 92￿97.
Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor (2009). ￿Financial In-
stability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008.￿ NBER
Working Papers 14826, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Sekine, Toshitaka (2009). ￿On Recent Monetary Policy in Japan.￿ Bank of Japan.
Shin, Hyun Song (2010). Risk and Liquidity. Oxford University Press.
Stockman, Alan C, and Linda L Tesar (1995). ￿Tastes and Technology in a Two-
Country Model of the Business Cycle: Explaining International Comovements.￿
American Economic Review, 85(1), 168￿85.
Ventura, Jaume (2002). ￿Bubbles and Capital Flows.￿ CEPR Discussion Papers
3657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
22Appendix
A Derivation of the Model
From the optimization problem de￿ne in (4) to (7), we can derive the ￿rst order
conditions as follows:
































































































fk (zt+1;ht+1;kt+1) + qt+1
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where qt and q
t are the ratios of the Lagrangian multipliers on the resource constraint
over (6) and (7), respectively. They are the relative prices of the capital in a utility
unit and therefore considered to be the theoretical stock prices. As for functional
forms, we assume that






























yt denotes the output. The technology shocks follow an AR(1) process:








 zt =  zt 1 +  ut;
where ut, u
t and  ut denote iid shocks.
A1A.1 Real Interest Rates
Since we solve the planner’s problem, we do not derive the equations for relative
prices. Real interest rates in this economy can be derived by consumer i’s optimiza-
tion problem with respect to bond holdings in each country. A representative home





subject to the budget constraint:
at+1 + Et [pt;t+1bt+1] + ct + it  wtht + r
k
t kt + (1 + rt)at + bt;
and the law of motion for capital:








at and bt denote amounts of ￿nancial assets and the Arrow security. pt;t+1 and rk
t
denote the price of the Arrow security and the cost of capital. From the ￿rst order
necessary condition with respect to ￿nancial assets and the Arrow securities, we can
derive
uc (ct;ht) =  (1 + rt+1)uc (ct+1;ht+1);
pt;t+1uc (ct;ht) = uc (ct+1;ht+1):

































The last equation can be derived from the constant real exchange rate normalized
to unity. We can assume this without loss of generality under the assumption of two




Thus, real interest rates are equated across countries.









We calibrate the parameters as in Table 2. They are all on quarterly basis.
B Dynamic Factor Analysis
B.1 Methodology
The applications of the dynamic factor analysis, such as based on Harvey (1991),
to understand the co-movements of the international economic as well as ￿nancial
developments are vast. Among them, we closely follow Kose, Otrok and Whiteman
(2003, 2008), Diebold, Li, and Yue (2008), and Sekine (2009), that use the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to estimate the large number of parameters
in this multi-country analysis.
We estimate a state space model for reduced form errors, ut, in (1):
ut =  ft + t;
ft =  ft 1 + t; (9)
t = t 1 + t:
ft and t denote the global factor and shock, that a￿ect all countries simultaneously.
t and t denote a (n   1)1 vector of country speci￿c factors and shocks. Note
the spillover index captures the degree of interactions both in positive and negative
relationships, while the global factor is the in￿uence, which a￿ects all economies
simultaneously and in the same directions.
Parameter,  , and parameter matrices,   and , are computed by the maxi-
mum likelihood estimation using the Kalman ￿lter with the MCMC method on (9).
The variance-covariance matrix of t is assumed to be a diagonal matrix with diag-
B3Table 3: Prior Distribution
   N (0;1)
  N (0;I)
 i  N (0;1)
1=i  Gamma(0:5;0:005)
Figure 13: Factors for Stock Price
onal component, i. The conditional densities are computed from 20,000 samples
simulated using the algorithm proposed by Chib and Greenberg (1994). 20 Table
1 displays the prior distributions. With parameters and factors in (9) at hand,
we can compute the contributions of the global shock, t, and the country-speci￿c
(idiosyncratic) shocks, t, respectively on zt in (1).
B.2 Results on Stock Prices
Figure 13 illustrates the sources of ￿uctuations in stock markets during the recent
￿nancial crisis. Contributions from country’s speci￿c factors are small, while the
global factor has signi￿cant e￿ects on stock prices. Especially, in Japan and the
20For the details of the MCMC used in this paper, see Appendix in Diebold, Li, and Yue (2008).
B4US, the country’s own factors do not play signi￿cant roles in ￿uctuations of stock
prices. On the other hand, the domestic speci￿c factor, however, explains most of
the dynamics of the stock price in China.
B5